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RHEHNSC/NSC WASHDC  
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S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 02 ABU DHABI 004302

SIPDIS

C O R R E C T E D C O P Y -- REFERENCES IN TEXT CORRECTED

SIPDIS

DEPARTMENT FOR PM A/S HILLEN, NEA DAS GRAY  
DOD FOR OSD A/S RODMAN AND DAS KIMMITT  
NSC FOR ABRAMS, DORAN AND RAMCHAND

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TAGS: [MCA](#) [PREL](#) [PTER](#) [PARM](#) [MOPS](#) [MASS](#) [IR](#) [AF](#) [AE](#)  
SUBJECT: GSD ISSUES REVIEWED AT JMC WORKING GROUP MEETINGS

REFS: A) ABU DHABI 4166 (General Moseley)  
B) ABU DHABI 4077, 4078, 4079 (GSD visit)  
C) ABU DHABI 3851 (UAE Defense Spending)

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Classified by Ambassador Michele J. Sison, reasons 1.4 (b)  
and (d).

¶1. (C) Working groups following up on the June, 2006 Joint Military Commission (JMC) met November 14 in Abu Dhabi, reviewing action items and charting a path towards deeper U.S.-UAE military cooperation. The thoroughness of UAE engagement on a number of items discussed, including topics which are also part of the Gulf Security Dialogue (GSD), indicate that the UAE is focused on procurement and coordination issues critical to defending the nation (although concrete decisions tend to take time). UAE Armed Forces Chief of Staff Lt. General Hamad Mohammed Thani Al-Rumaithi (in a separate office call) put the UAE effort into perspective by clearly stating to U.S. delegation head Rear Admiral John Miller (DCDR NAVCENT) that the UAE did not "trust" the Iranian regime and continued its contingency planning.

Seeking Predator B  
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¶2. (S) UAE Air Force and Air Defense Commander Major General Mohammed Sweidan Al-Qamzi (JMC working group chair and a core member of GSD), reiterated the UAE's request for Predator B (armed), a point made multiple times during GSD discussions October 19 (ref B). The UAE sees the Predator as particularly appropriate to border patrol missions, and also raised this request with Air Force Chief of Staff General Moseley on October 29 (ref A). UAE participants cited their "special relationship" with the U.S. military a number of times during the meetings, suggesting that close ties warranted exceptional treatment in procurement (and intelligence exchanges).

Still uncertain on air defense options  
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¶3. (C) The U.S. has for some time pressed the UAE to consider an interoperable air defense network, such as Patriot PAC-3, as part of a layered, integrated system to help defend against Iranian missiles. The UAE has made no clear decisions, but has agreed within the context of the

Bilateral Air Defense Initiative (BADI) to receive a team within a three-month time frame to at least discuss options for future systems -- Patriot PAC-3, HAWK "21" upgrade, and SL-AMRAAM among them. The U.S. delegation to the working groups presented a time frame of "within one year" to begin discussion of actual purchases, a target to which the UAE did not object. (Note: The UAE has often raised the complexities of FMS procurements as a complicating factor in big-ticket purchase decisions. Any final decision on air defense will no doubt take time as the UAE sorts out options, juggling air defense needs and systems available on the international market (see ref C for context on UAE defense spending decisions). End note.)

#### Goal of Shared Early Warning

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¶4. (C) Also related to BADI, the UAE agreed that a U.S. team should visit in January to discuss Shared Early Warning (SEW); the basic SEW system could be installed quickly and at a reasonable cost (five to seven million USD for equipment and 5-year operating costs). The UAE agreed to focus on SEW requirements in coming months, potentially working towards eventually building and integrating a common air picture.

#### Support for Afghanistan

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¶5. (S) The working group also reviewed CENTCOM planning to assist in the transport of 50 additional personnel and equipment (including 6 BMP fighting vehicles and 4 LeClerc tanks) to Afghanistan. The goal is to complete the airlift to Tarin Kwot (possibly via Kandahar) by late November. Discussion of additional troop plus-up to Afghanistan is pending further decisions by the UAEG. Expansion of the UAE Special Operations Forces compound at Bagram AFB was also discussed. (Note: In sidebar discussions with USLO Chief it was clear that this request for additional space at Bagram was not/not related to earlier discussions of an additional

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1,000 UAE troops to Afghanistan. End note.)

#### Exercises and training

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¶6. (C) The U.S. delegation took the opportunity to thank the UAE for joining LEADING EDGE 07, in spite of negative pressure from Iran prior to and during the exercise. This represents the UAE's first participation in a PSI exercise. Working group also discussed a broad range of exercises and issues associated with training, military exchanges, visas, logistics, and intelligence exchanges.

#### Navy communications

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¶7. (C) The U.S. urged the UAE to study potential acquisition of Lin 11 (and ultimately Link 16) communications systems to facilitate intra-UAE coordination as well as interoperability with the U.S. A site survey and a LINK 16 demonstration are planned in December and January respectively, followed immediately by the Command and Control Interoperability Board (CCIB) in January at Eglin AFB, Florida.

#### Implementation Agreement shared

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¶8. (C) The UAE passed to the U.S. delegation a draft implementation agreement setting out parameters for the administration of future JMC working groups. The document has been forwarded to the USCENTCOM Judge Advocate and J-5 for review. The implementation agreement is not specifically related to the Defense Cooperation Agreement (DCA) as had been anticipated. The current DCA has been languishing (un-ratified by the UAE) for some time; the UAE team offered

no new views on the DCA beyond suggesting that it represented a "good faith" agreement rather than an iron-clad legal pact.

19. (C) Comprised of working groups for Training and Operations, Logistics, Intelligence and Security, Armaments, and Communications, the JMC follow-up engaged a large group of Emirati officers (over 30) in issues critical to deepening our military engagement -- also advancing GSD-related interests. In fact, from a mil-to-mil perspective, UAE engagement in this JMC working group discussion was on par with a full JMC.

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